This paper did a critique of Wittgenstein’s critique of Metaphysics in
the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Wittgenstein, in this book dictates
that the sole function of philosophy is to monitor the bounds of sense,
to elucidate philosophically problematic sentences, and to show that
attempts to traverse the bounds of sense are futile. Hence, this work
employed the critical expository, analytical, and content analysis. Thus,
this study reveals that, Wittgenstein with a radical thrust into what he
sets out to do, ironically brings the atomistic and the foundationalist
traditions to par. Both are ripe for demolition. When he presents
metaphysical utterances as nonsense, that is, the violation of the
bounds of sense, he says the thrust against the limits of language does
not point to what purports to be nothing. He insists that the tendency,
the thrust, points to something. This paper asks if that something is not
metaphysics, since he purports that the entire book is representative of
what he called nonsense? This study further attempts to examine why
Wittgenstein was led to reject metaphysical statements as nonsense in
the Tractatus and to evaluate his position critically. Thus, this work
holds that, if the criteria on which metaphysical statements are rejected
in the Tractatus are applied to the Tractatus, much of the Tractatus
would be adjudged as nonsense. This being the case then, the self-destructive character of this position becomes apparent. Hence, by the
same token so also is the attack on metaphysical statements as
nonsense invalidated.
